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1. Introduction 
Financial systems are an integral part of modern economic systems. The structure, 
level of sophistication and relative importance of financial institutions differ 
considerably across countries around the world. However, since money is intrinsic to 
almost all economic relationships, financial intermediation plays a critical role in 
economic activity. 
The debate on relative importance of the financial system for the broader economy 
began with publication of seminal papers by Walter Bagehot (1991 (1873)) and 
Joseph Schumpeter (1936 (1911)), who supported the strong finance-growth link. 
However, despite considerable attention in the literature, the debate on the importance 
of finance for economic performance remains unsettled. 
Some economists have argued that the finance-growth relationship is unimportant. For 
example, Lucas (1988) maintained that the role of financial factors in economic 
growth has been overstated. Moreover, several noted development economists, 
including Chandavarkar (1992), Meier and Seers (1984) and Stern (1989), have 
expressed their scepticism over the role of the financial system in economic 
development. However, a majority of the economics profession contend that there is a 
relationship between the financial development and economic development, but there 
is no consensus on the direction of the causal relationship. 
Possible directions of causality between financial development and growth have been 
labelled by Patrick (1966) as the ‘supply-leading’ and ‘demand-following’ 
hypotheses. The supply-leading hypothesis posits a causal relationship from 
institutions to markets that increases the supply of financial services and thus leads to 
real economic growth. A substantial theoretical and empirical literature on this subject 
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has sought to demonstrate that financial development causes economic growth. 
McKinnon (1973), King and Levine (1993a; 1993b), Neusser and Kugler (1998), 
Levine (1997), and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) all support the supply-leading 
explanation. On the other hand, the demand-following hypothesis postulates a causal 
relationship from economic growth to financial development. In terms of this 
explanation, an increasing demand for financial services might induce an expansion in 
the financial sector as the real economy grows (i.e. the financial sector responds 
passively to economic growth). Gurley and Shaw (1967), Goldsmith (1969), and Jung 
(1986) have all supported this hypothesis. A third option is that the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth is bi-directional, where both 
supply-leading and demand-following forces occur simultaneously (see, for example, 
Capasso 2003). 
The work of Levine (1997) is particularly notable. He has developed a functional 
approach to link successful performance of the financial system and economic 
development. Levine (1997) contends that financial systems facilitate trading, 
hedging, diversifying, and pooling of risk; allocate resources; monitor managers and 
exert corporate control; mobilise savings; and facilitate the exchange of goods and 
services. By fulfilling these functions, financial systems influence economic growth in 
two main ways: through capital accumulation and technological innovation, which 
correspond to physical and human capital, respectively, in endogenous growth theory 
(Jones 2005; Romer 1986, 1990). 
Successful economic policymaking relies not only on a  thorough understanding of 
economic theory, but also on a keen appreciation of pertinent economic history. 
Fortunately, in the present context, there is an extensive scholarly literature on 
  4 
 
 
financial liberalisation in developing countries. While it is true that each particular 
case is perforce unique, important conclusions can nonetheless be drawn from the 
outcomes of the different approaches adopted in different developing and transition 
economies. 
In this paper, we re-visit the experiences of two developing countries that underwent 
relatively successful financial reforms in 1980s and early 1990s. The Indonesian 
financial development programme over the period 1983 to 1992 aimed to transform 
the country’s financial system as a part of a wider economic renewal programme that 
included reform of the taxation system, international trade regulation and governance. 
The programme was adopted in response to the deteriorating economic situation, 
particularly in the oil industry – Indonesia’s major export - and was intended to 
strengthen the economy through greater diversification (Chant & Pangestu 1994). 
The South Korean programme of reforms over the time period 1981 to 1992 
represents a u nique example of how a car efully designed and gradual path of 
economic and financial reform can bring growth and prosperity. South Korea 
(hereafter Korea) chose an export-oriented strategy of economic development, putting 
substantial resources into priority sectors. A notable feature of the Korean path is its 
so-called ‘one-side openness’, which implied active export of Korean goods 
simultaneously accompanied by restrictive import policies. 
The pre-reform environment in these countries differed substantially; nevertheless the 
purpose of reforms has been similar: to develop a modern financial system that would 
efficiently cater for the needs of the economy and thus contribute to economic growth. 
The scope of the reforms has also been analogous. What differed in each case were 
the pace and the sequencing of the reforms. Accordingly, an examination of the 
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experiences of financial reform in these countries should teach us important lessons 
and hopefully assist policymakers in tailoring the optimal pace and the key elements 
of sequencing of financial reforms for their respective countries. The novelty of this 
paper resides in the way in which we illustrate the proposition that the success of the 
financial development programmes is clearly linked with ability of policymakers to 
design and implement wider economic reforms in which financial development plays 
an important role. 
The paper itself consists of five main sections. Section 2 looks at pre-reform political 
and economic environment in two countries. This is followed by description of the 
state of pre-reform financial sectors in both countries in section 3. Section 4 examines 
their respective financial development policies and their consequences. Section 5 
discusses the socio-economic impact of the reforms. The paper ends in section 6 with 
some brief concluding remarks. 
2. Pre-reform political and economic environment 
Political history in Indonesia over last three decades of 20th
The average rate of growth of the Indonesian economy was 8 per cent per annum over 
the period of 1971 to 1980. Oil revenues accounted for 70 t o 80 p er cent of 
 century was dominated by 
the late General Suharto, who came into power in 1966 as a result of a military coup. 
Suharto adopted the term ‘New Order’ to designate his system of authoritarian rule. 
The New Order lasted until his forced resignation in 1998. In contrast, the political 
establishment of Korea since the Korean War in 1950-53 and until 1993 w as 
dominated by military leadership. The political systems of both countries during these 
periods were stable, thus providing a good foundation to undertake major economic 
reforms. 
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government revenues and 80 per cent of exports in the late 1970s, when the decision 
was made to diversify economy by attracting investments to the non-oil production 
sector. Domestic savings were 23.8 per cent of GDP during the period of 1971-75, 
with 5-6 per cent higher rates towards the end of 1970s. Savings were generated 
largely by the oil revenues accruing to the government, and resources were 
redistributed to its priority sectors. Investment rates were similar to savings rate levels 
over 1971-1975, but around 5 pe rcent lower than the rate of savings in 1976-1980. 
The efficiency of these investments, however, was low (Bisat, Johnston & 
Sundararajan 1999). The inflation rate was high, though gradually falling in the 
1970s, only to rise again in 1979 to 1981. Indonesia has implemented pegged 
exchange rate arrangements for its currency (the rupiah) since 1971. Initially, the US 
dollar was chosen as the peg currency and the rate was fixed at 415 rupiahs per US 
dollar. However, in 1978, following the example of Singapore and Malaysia, it was 
decided to peg the rupiah to a basket of currencies of major trading partners. 
However, on a number of occasions the government used currency devaluations as a 
policy response to external shocks. 
GDP per capita has remained low, although rising over the decade from US$245 to 
US$417. Similarly, life expectancy was relatively low in 53-56 years range, gradually 
rising toward the end of the period. 
In the early 1980s, the price of oil, Indonesia’s main export, began to fall, thus 
creating macroeconomic imbalances in the economy. As a result, the government 
decided to undertake macroeconomic adjustment and to reduce its dependency on oil 
through export diversification. Moreover, it undertook financial system reforms aimed 
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at increasing domestic savings and expanding involvement of private financial 
institutions in financing the country’s economy (Juoro 1993). 
Korea used detailed five-year plans as a b enchmark for economic management. 
Initially, in the 1960s, Korea decided to concentrate on d evelopment of labour-
intensive production of light manufactured goods with subsequent exports all around 
the world. Initially, this strategy paid off well with good rates of economic growth and 
low unemployment. However, in early 1970s, the government realised that increased 
competition from other Asian countries and protectionist measures from industrialised 
countries could ruin its growth achievements. Therefore, it decided to re-orient all 
efforts in developing competitive heavy and chemical industries and export high-
value-added goods to the world market. Moreover, policy makers believed that 
promoting the heavy and chemical industries could assist in the development of local 
defence industries and thus reduce the reliance on the US troops stationed in Korea. 
To assist the development of these industries, the government intervened in resource 
allocation through taxation, finance and restrictions on imports (Yoo & Moon 1999).  
To protect infant industries and support their quick development, the Korean 
government imposed large tariffs in those sectors and provided policy loans on 
preferential terms. Moreover, substantial tax incentives were introduced for priority 
industries that included iron and steel, nonferrous metals, shipbuilding, general 
machinery, chemicals, and electronics. At first, this policy provided sound returns in 
terms of economic growth of over 8 pe r cent. However, the policy led to a 
disproportionate distribution of resources and to macroeconomic imbalances. Firstly, 
priority sector resource allocations were often made at the expense of non-favoured 
industries. Secondly, since smaller companies could not potentially handle the capital 
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requirements of the priority projects, those projects were granted to large business 
groups, contributing to a high concentration of economic power. Thirdly, a booming 
credit expansion to the priority industries caused a rapid growth in money supply, 
causing inflation to rise over the 20 pe r cent mark in 1980. S ince real interest rates 
remained low, inflation made financial savings less attractive reducing the domestic 
savings ratio from over 28 per cent in 1978 to under 24 per cent in 1980 (Nam 1994). 
The oil shock of 1978 exposed structural weaknesses in the Korean economy and 
economic growth declined to a negative level in 1980. Moreover, chronic 
overcapacity and underutilisation caused by excessive competition and 
overinvestment in the heavy and chemical industries led to high inflation and foreign 
debt (Shin & Ha 2002). In response, the government introduced a number of measures 
to return to a high-level of economic growth. A flexible exchange rate was introduced 
to replace the peg to the US dollar. Measures to combat wage, dividend and interest 
rate hikes helped to reduce the current account deficit and inflation. Furthermore, 
gradual removal of subsidies and tax benefits to heavy industries coupled with a 
reduction of tariffs was implemented. Finally, the liberalisation measures to improve 
efficiency of financial sector took off. 
In 1970-1980, Korea remained middle-income economy with GDP per capita rising 
from US$2253 to US$3558. Similarly, life expectancy rose from 63 years at the 
beginning of the decade to 67 years at the end. The comparative statistics of the key 
economic and social variables 1971-1982 are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Key economic and social indicators in the pre-reform period 
Indicator 5-year average Annual average 
  1971-75 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
GDP growth, %  
Indonesia  8 6 9 9 7 9 8 1 
Korea  7 11 10 9 7 -1 6 7 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)  
Indonesia  275 313 333 355 372 397 420 417 
Korea  2253 2709 2934 3158 3322 3221 3367 3558 
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 international US$)  
Indonesia  na na na na na 1351 1432 1420 
Korea  na na na na na 5176 5410 5717 
Gross domestic savings to GDP, %  
Indonesia  24 27 29 27 33 38 32 29 
Korea  19 25 28 29 29 24 24 26 
Investment to GDP, %  
Indonesia  24 24 23 24 25 24 27 28 
Korea  27 27 29 33 36 32 30 29 
Inflation, %                
Indonesia  20 20 11 8 16 18 12 9 
Korea  15 15 10 14 18 29 21 7 
Exchange rate,                 
Indonesia, Rupiah/USD 415 415 415 442 623 627 632 661 
Korea, Won/USD 405 484 484 484 484 607 681 731 
Unemployment (% of labour force)  
Indonesia  na na na na na na na 3 
Korea  na na na na na 5 4 4 
Life expectancy (Years)  
Indonesia  na 53 na na 55 na 56 na 
Korea  63 na 65 na 65 66 66 67 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators Online, International Financial Statistics Online databases and the author’s 
calculations 
3. Main characteristics of the pre-reform financial sectors 
Since taking power in 1966, t he Indonesian New Order government took steps to 
reduce its control over the extremely centralised financial system. In 1967, foreign 
banks were allowed into the market, but with substantial restrictions on t heir 
operations. In 1968, a separate central bank - the Bank Indonesia - was established. 
In 1974, a  programme of direct credit control and allocation was introduced by the 
Bank Indonesia. Initially the system of direct credit control was designed to control 
aggregate money and credit to limit the expansionary pressures caused by the oil 
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boom. Later, however, the system was increasingly used as a mechanism for credit 
allocation, with detailed ceilings by type of credit, category of assets, previous 
performance, and aggregate monetary targets (Chant & Pangestu 1994). However, 
state-owned banks had larger and easier access to priority loans at highly subsidised 
interest rates. These loans in 1982 amounted to 27 per cent of total loans. 
State-owned banks were also subject to deposit ceilings and interest on deposits was 
often negative in real terms. Foreign and domestic private banks, as well as NBFIs, 
were free to set their deposit and credit rates. As a r esult, the share of domestic 
currency deposits attracted by the state-owned banks fell from 82 t o 56 per cent in 
1978-1982. Foreign currency deposits were not subject to interest rates control. 
Consequently, their share in total deposits rapidly grew to 17 pe r cent in 1982. N o 
private banks had access to foreign exchange licenses due to prohibitive conditions set 
by the regulators (Bisat, Johnston & Sundararajan 1999; McLeod 1991). 
The branch network management policy of all financial institutions was subject to 
detailed regulations and restrictions depending on the ownership structure of each 
institution. The interbank money market was small and lacking liquidity. 
Prudential regulations and banking supervision were poor until reforms were 
introduced. Reliable information was lacking and basic regulations on c apital 
adequacy, loan concentration and provisioning, and interest accrual rules were weak. 
NBFIs were under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance (Bisat, Johnston & 
Sundararajan 1999). 
Money and capital market were underdeveloped. The Indonesian stock market, 
reopened in 1977, was largely inactive due to complex regulations related to equity 
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issues, including disclosure requirements, minimum dividend rates, and a maximum 
trading range for most stocks (Beng 1993). 
Monetary indicators in Indonesia in the 1970s stood at a level common for economies 
with a repressed financial sector. For example, the broad money to GDP ratio was a 
meagre 16.1 pe r cent. Open market operations as an instrument of monetary policy 
were largely unused. Instead, monetary policy was based on direct interest controls, 
credit ceilings, and access to central bank liquidity credits. The effectiveness of the 
central bank refinancing policy was weak due to the development-oriented objectives 
of monetary policy and the automatic availability of credit for this purpose (Bisat, 
Johnston & Sundararajan 1999). 
The structure of the Indonesian financial sector in 1979-1983 is summarised in Table 
2. Over that period, the financial sector was largely dominated by state-owned banks, 
which accounted for over 84 per cent of the financial sector assets. The share of the 
market for private and foreign banks was less than 12 pe r cent, while non-bank 
financial institutions accounted for only four per cent. 
Table 2. Structure of the Indonesian financial sector 
 
 Number of institutions Number of branches 
Assets 
(Rp billion) Assets (%) 
Indicator 03/1979 03/1982 1980 1983 1983 
Total of financial institutions >139 215 na 49256 100 
Central Bank 1 1 na 20348 41.3 
Deposit money banks 127 118 866 27116 55.1 
State-owned banks 33 33 685 21308 43.3 
   Commercial banks 5 5 403 18570 37.7    Development banks (including regional) 27 27 1919 3.9 
   Savings banks 1 1 282 819 1.7 
Private banks 94 85 281 5808 11.8 
   Foreign 11 11 20   
   Domestic 83 74 261   
Non-bank financial institutions >12 97 na 1792 3.7 
   Insurance companies Unknown 83* na 471 1.0 
   Other financial intermediaries 12 14 na 1321 2.7 
*Data for December 1981. 
Source: Beng (1993), Bisat, Johnston and Sundararajan (1999) and McLeod (1991) and author’s calculations.  
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The financial system of Korea before 1980 c an be characterised as being highly 
regulated and controlled by the government in line with its five-year economic plans. 
The powerful Economic Planning Board (EPB) used the banking system as an 
instrument of its developmental policies by setting interest rates and directing loans to 
priority sectors. Moreover, it served as an intermediary between foreign and domestic 
capital by controlling the inflow of foreign capital (Shin & Ha 2002). 
The financial sector was rather versatile and consisted of nationwide, local and 
specialised banks, branches of foreign banks, a capital market, various non-bank 
financial institutions, and an active informal credit market. Non-bank financial 
institutions come to existence in early 1970s and rapidly developed towards the end of 
decade to complement and compete with banks (Park 1994). 
Due to high barriers of entry, the number of local banks remained largely unchanged. 
However, it was compensated by a substantial expansion of branch networks and 
increased presence of foreign banks. Nonetheless, foreign banks had substantial 
restrictions on branch expansion and the range of activities allowed. Banks were used 
by the government as a m ean to finance investments and guarantee foreign 
investments in the priority sectors (Bisat, Johnston & Sundararajan 1999). The 
structure of the Korean banking sector in 1975-1985 is summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3. Structure of the Korean banking sector 
 Number of 
Banks 
Assets  
(billion won) 
Number of 
Banks 
Assets  
(billion won) 
Number of 
Banks 
Assets  
(billion won) 
 1975 1980 1985 
Nationwide 15 2890 38 11938 60 29772 
   Domestic 6 2485 5 10494 7 26646 
   Foreign 9 405 33 1442 53 3126 
Local  10 na 10 na 10 na 
Specialised 6 na 6 na 7 na 
Total 31 na 54 na 77 na 
Source: Bisat, Johnston and Sundararajan (1999:175) and Park and Kim (1994) 
  13 
 
 
The entry barriers for NBFIs were smaller than for the banking sector and were 
further relaxed in the mid-1970s to reduce the importance of the informal sector. As a 
result, the number and variety of NBFIs grew rapidly, but despite all efforts, the 
informal sector remained active. 
The role of the central bank was executed by the Bank of Korea. Its functions 
included conducting monetary policy and bank supervision. In the conduct of 
monetary policy, the Bank of Korea largely referred to direct instruments, like interest 
rates and individual bank credit ceilings, a v aried reserve requirement ratio, direct 
credit allocation to priority sectors and subsidised central bank rediscount operations. 
Prudential regulations on banks were strict, though to a lesser degree on NBFIs (Bisat, 
Johnston & Sundararajan 1999). 
The interest rate in Korea remained highly regulated. The authorities were trying to 
keep ceilings on deposit and lending rates in line with the rate of inflation. However, 
with inflation hitting 29 per cent and 21 per cent in 1980 and 1981 respectively, the 
real interest rate turned negative in these years. The difference between preferential 
and non-preferential loan rates remained roughly flat during the period of 1970-1980 
and stood within the range of 0.8-1 percent. NBFIs had higher credit ceilings than 
banks and were also less burdened by limits in charging fees and commission. 
4. Financial sector reforms and their outcomes 
4.1. Indonesia: 1983-1992  
During the period of 1983-1992, Indonesia introduced comprehensive adjustment and 
liberalisation programmes that included exchange rate devaluations, deregulation of 
the trade, industry and financial sectors, as well as greater fiscal discipline. The 
programmes were described by Ariff and Khalid (2005:141) as ‘genuine reforms to 
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restructure the economy on a balanced basis’. The reforms were implemented during 
two main phases. 
The first phase of reforms took place during 1983-1985 and represented a partial step 
towards restoring the market mechanisms. It was intended to improve the efficiency 
of the financial system by relaxing the constraints on the activities of existing banks. 
The reforms included the elimination of the credit ceilings system, the removal of 
interest rate controls on most categories of deposits and on all loans, except on those 
refinanced by the Bank Indonesia, and extensive modification of the liquidity credit 
system. The 1983-1985 reforms effectively eliminated the direct instruments of 
monetary control used by the central bank. This made it necessary for the authorities 
to urgently develop the government debt market required for open-market operations. 
Second stage commenced in February 1984. Bank Indonesia resumed issuing central 
bank certificates (SBIs) - short-term debt instruments to be used as a main monetary 
tool. A year later, to improve the liquidity of the money market, a new instrument, 
banker’s acceptances (SBPU), was introduced, and a publicly owned investment 
company was founded to act as a market maker in the money market (Juoro 1993). 
Despite these reforms, competition in the banking sector continued to be constrained 
in several ways. First of all, entry requirements for new banks were not eased. 
Therefore the total number of banks changed little over the period 1983-1987. 
Secondly, the state-owned banks retained monopoly powers over the deposits of state 
enterprises. Moreover, only state and a handful of large private local banks had access 
to the foreign exchange business. Lastly, the Bank Indonesia continued to be a major 
provider of cheap credit, used by financial institutions for lending to the private 
sector. 
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A third phase of financial reform commenced in 1988, following a deterioration of the 
external sector. The main elements of the reform included: (i) lifting barriers for entry 
by new banks; (ii) permitting unlimited branch expansion to existing local banks that 
met soundness standards; (iii) extending the limit of branch expansion for foreign 
banks and NBFIs from one to seven cities; (iv) streamlining foreign exchange 
licensing procedures; (v) allowing state enterprises to invest up to 50 per cent of their 
deposits into non-state banks; and (vi) unifying the reserve requirement among 
various classes of banks and deposits, and reducing it to 2 per cent. 
Prudential measures to strengthen the financial system were also included in the 
reform agenda. Legal limits to a single borrower or a group of related borrowers were 
introduced; capital requirements were raised; central bank supervision was extended 
to the rural banks and NBFIs; and a beginning was made with the introduction of a 
comprehensive supervisory system (Chant & Pangestu 1994). 
Since first phase of reforms primarily targeted banking sector, development of capital 
market has not really progress in early 1980s. The growth of corporate securities 
market was constrained by reluctance of private corporations to go public prior to 
substantial reforms in this sector. However, with third phase of reforms, several 
measures were also taken to improve the money and capital markets. Interest income 
from bank deposits became subject to a withholding tax, thus removing the privileged 
tax treatment of bank deposits over other debt and equity instruments. Banks and 
other NBFIs were permitted to issue shares. The Bank Indonesia organised a network 
of dealers and agents to trade with SBIs and to act as market makers on the secondary 
markets. All money market operations of the central bank were to be conducted 
through this network. In 1990, c omprehensive institutional and regulatory reforms 
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were initiated, including the privatisation of the Jakarta Stock Exchange (Bisat, 
Johnston & Sundararajan 1999). 
4.2. Korea: 1982-1991  
After the economic decline in the early 1980s, Korea launched extensive reforms to 
bring the economy back to a pattern of growth and reduce the inflation rate. The 
reform package included currency devaluation, tight monetary policy, strict wage 
guidelines, and partial liberalisation of administered prices. Moreover, the Korean 
government introduced macroeconomic stabilisation, financial reform programmes, 
liberalised the external sector and improved allocation of public investments. The 
decision to liberalise the financial system was due to belief that the inefficient 
allocation of financial resources exacerbated imbalances in the economy. 
The financial reform package included institutional reforms to encourage competition 
in the financial sector, further liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocations, 
wider use of indirect instruments in conducting monetary policy and gradual capital 
account liberalisation. To promote institutional development, the government eased 
the regulations related to organisational, budgetary, branching and business practices 
of the banks. This enabled commercial banks to undertake wider range of activities, 
including sales of commercial bills, credit cards, sales of government bonds under 
repurchase agreement, factoring, mutual instalment savings, trusts, negotiable 
certificates of deposits, as well as the acceptance, discount and sale of trade bills (Oh 
& Park 1998). In 1981-1983, the government sold its share in all five nationwide 
banks. Entry barriers for new financial institutions were lowered. Two new 
nationwide commercial banks were founded in 1982-1983, many finance and mutual 
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savings companies were established, and a number of foreign bank branches were 
opened. 
A number of reforms were implemented in the area of monetary and credit 
management. In addition to direct monetary tools like rediscount mechanisms, reserve 
requirement directed credit, and interest rate ceilings, the indirect instrument in the 
form of stabilisation bond s ales started to be developed. Moreover, the direct 
monetary mechanisms were gradually loosened. In 1981, t he central bank unified 
reserve requirements for all banks and types of deposit and reduced the rate to 3.5 per 
cent. In 1982, i ndividual credit ceilings of nationwide banks were abolished. 
Moreover, directed credits to priority sectors were progressively reduced by gradual 
abolishing preferential rates applying to various policy loans. 
Interest rate liberalisation began in 1982 with the reduction of the differential between 
general and preferential lending rates. Another significant step was taken in 1984, 
when financial institutions were permitted to set up their lending rates according to 
their assessment of creditworthiness but within the set range. The set range was 
gradually widened from 0.5 to 3 per cent. In 1988, the authorities introduced further 
interest rate liberalisation measures. These included decontrol of most bank and non-
bank lending rates, some long-term deposits, interest rates on f inancial debentures, 
corporate bonds, asset management accounts and funds and some money market 
instruments. Rates on some priority loans and short-term deposits, however, were not 
deregulated. Moreover, the liberalisation measures were not fully implemented due to 
adverse economic conditions in 1989. T he revised the four-phase interest rate 
liberalisation programme was announced in 1991. According to the programme, the 
liberalisation was to start with loan rate liberalisation, followed by gradual deposit 
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rate liberalisation. Long-term and large deposits were to be liberalised before short-
term and smaller deposits. 
The Korean monetary authorities have pursued gradual approach to capital account 
liberalisation since 1981. Initially, they created open-end international trusts to 
promote indirect investments by Europeans. Then, in 1984, they shortened the list of 
businesses where foreign ownership is prohibited. Korean firms were allowed to 
issues convertible bonds and bonds with warrants at international markets since 1985, 
and permitted to participate in syndicates underwriting foreign securities since 1987. 
Most significant measures of capital account liberalisation were implemented in 1991-
1992, when foreigners acquired the right to buy Korean securities (Bekaert, Harvey & 
Lundblad 2003; Park 1994). 
4.3. Outcomes of the financial sector reforms 
As a result of the reforms, financial sectors both in Indonesia and Korea experienced 
significant growth. In Indonesia, broad money to GDP and bank deposits to GDP 
ratios more than doubled, whereas both financial intermediation ratios showed 
substantial rise over the reform period. Domestic credit to GDO ratios more then 
tripled over the period 1983-1993 to 49 pe rcent. Foreign direct investment boomed 
since the late 1980s, increasing the dependence of the Indonesian economy on foreign 
capital. 
Similarly, in Korea, the M2/GDP ratio, which remained unchanged in 1970s, grew 
from 33 per cent in 1983 to 36 per cent in 1993. Financial intermediation ratios (total 
and private) also grew up to 15 per cent. Improved formal market environment since 
1982 as well as excellent growth of the capital market since the 1987 reform 
contributed to enhanced financial intermediation ratios. Domestic credit to private 
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sector has improved from around 55 percent in 1983 to over  60 per cent in the 1990s. 
In contrast, FDI to GDP ratios moved into negative territory as a result of active 
investing abroad by Korea firms. Table 4 summarises financial liberalisation 
indicators in Indonesia and Korea. 
Table 4. Indicators of financial liberalisation  
Indicator  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
M2 (% of GDP) 
Indonesia 17  18  21  25  25  26  28  34  37  39  40  
Korea 33  32  32  32  32  33  35  34  34  35  36  
FIR total (% of GDP)  
Indonesia 25 27 30 34 36 38 42 52 53 58 57 
Korea 45 44 45 48 52 56 61 63 62 62 60 
FIR private (% of GDP ) 
Indonesia 15 17 19 22 24 28 35 48 47 46 49 
Korea 47 47 50 49 50 49 55 57 57 56 53 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
Indonesia 15  17  20  24  25  28  35  48  47  46  49  
Korea 55  54  57  56  57  54  60  63  62  61  61  
FDI/GDP (%) 
Indonesia 0.34 0.25 0.35 0.32 0.51 0.65 0.67 0.96 1.16 1.28 1.04 
Korea -0.07 0.06 -0.37 -0.69 0.07 0.20 0.23 -0.10 -0.10 -0.13 -0.21 
Notes:  FIR: Financial intermediation ratio = claims on public sector, claims on private sector and foreign assets. 
 FDI are measured as net inflow. 
  
Source: World Development Indicators Online; International Financial Statistics Online database and author’s calculations 
 
Competition in the Indonesian banking sector, particularly for private banks has 
substantially benefited from the removal of credit ceilings, interest rate controls, and 
discriminatory regulations on different financial intermediaries. As a result of 
competition, less efficient state-owned banks were forced to adopt modernisation 
programmes. Bank deposit rates became positive in real terms, though real lending 
rates, initially, did not rise. Banks had to accept a reduction of lending margins under 
pressure of increased competition. Loan rates on average were around 20 per cent per 
annum during most of the period, while state-owned banks on average charged lower 
rates than private banks. The difference, however, has been decreasing and the rates 
almost equalised by 1990. 
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In spite of increased deposit rates, the rate of growth of banks deposits fell. This was a 
result of exchange rate instability and expectations of rupiah devaluations. The lack of 
liquidity was offset by an expansion of central bank credit to the Indonesian banking 
system. 
Similarly, in Korea, the financial reforms of 1980s resulted in expansion of the formal 
financial sector, including the rise in number of banks and their branches, and an 
increase in number of non-bank financial institutions. Increased competition in the 
financial markets improved the allocative efficiency of financial resources. The 
structure of interest rates became more uniform, as differentials between credits to 
priority and non-priority sectors, and between bank and non-bank deposit rates, 
decreased. However, some legislation, which provided advantages to non-bank 
financial institutions, remained. Accordingly, NBFIs had higher credit ceilings and 
were exempt from the burden to provide directed credits (Bisat, Johnston & 
Sundararajan 1999). 
The bank deposit interest rates in 1981 were negative in real terms, due to a high level 
of inflation. As inflation was brought down to a single digit in 1982, i nterest rates 
became substantially positive. During 1984-1987, the real interest rates on one year 
deposit were in the range of 7 to 8 per cent, and that on general loans exceeded 8 per 
cent.  As inflation rose in late 1980s, the real interest rates fell to a 3-4 per cent range. 
An interesting feature is that nominal deposit and general loan rates remained 
unchanged during the period of 1985-1990, despite all liberalisation measures. 
The comparative statistics on exchange and interest rates are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Exchange rates and interest rates in Indonesia 
Indicator  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Exchange rate* (mkt) 
Indonesia 909 1026 1111 1286 1644 1686 1770 1843 1950 2030 2087 
Korea 776 806 870 881 823 731 671 708 733 781 803 
Inflation rate 
Indonesia 11.79 10.46 4.73 5.83 9.28 8.04 6.42 7.81 9.41 7.53 9.68 
Korea 3.42 2.31 2.46 2.75 3.05 7.15 5.70 8.58 9.30 6.31 4.75 
Interest rates (%) 
Money market rate 
Indonesia 13.17 18.63 10.33 n.a. 14.52 15.00 12.57 13.97 14.91 11.99 8.66 
Korea 13.00 11.39 9.35 9.70 8.93 9.62 13.28 14.03 17.03 14.32 12.12 
Deposit rate 
Indonesia 6.00 16.00 18.00 15.39 16.78 17.72 18.63 17.53 23.32 19.60 14.55 
Korea 8.00 9.17 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 8.58 
Lending rate 
Indonesia n.a. n.a. n.a. 21.49 21.67 22.10 21.70 20.83 25.53 24.03 20.59 
Korea 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.13 11.25 10.00 10.00 10.00 8.58 
*Local currency per US dollar  
Source: International Financial Statistics Online and author’s calculations 
 
A crucial ingredient of successful financial liberalisation programme is building a 
sound and efficient system of prudential regulation and supervision. However, this 
component experienced serious problems in both countries, particularly in Indonesia. 
The Indonesian system of prudential regulation and supervision remained weak, 
particularly at the stage of implementation. In many cases, large conglomerates 
simply abused their close relationships with politicians. Furthermore, reliance on 
foreign finance, particularly short-term debt, had increased, exposing it to foreign 
exchange risks. 
In Korea, a prudential regulations and supervision, in particular over NBFIs, remained 
a notable problem. Prudential regulations and supervision over merchant banks, such 
as BIS capital adequacy or loan concentration requirements, were virtually non-
existent. The sector has accumulated a significant mismatch in the maturity structures 
(64 per cent of borrowings were short-tern and 85per cent of lending was long-term), 
which monetary authorities failed to detect (Chang 1998). Moreover, the supervision 
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functions over NBFIs were widely dispersed and competence of supervisors was 
questionable. This was due to the staff rotating policy in the Financial Supervisory 
Commission and the Ministry of Finance and Economics. The time horizon of 
supervisory bureaucrats was too short. Supervisors were thus discouraged from 
developing new policies and enforcing existing ones (Kim & Lee 2004). Various 
other problems existed (i) a moral hazard problem in the form of an unstated 
assumption that the government would not let banks to fail, which often led to the 
inefficient use of loan funds; and (ii) the lack of a m eaningful financial disclosure 
system (Emery 2001). 
5. Socio-economic impact of the reforms 
The Indonesian economy underwent dramatic structural changes as a r esult of 
carefully designed liberalisation policies that aimed to improve the economic 
performance. With a rapid growth of income of over 7 pe r cent during the most of 
period, peaking in early 1990s, Indonesia moved from an impoverished nation with 
over 60 pe r cent of the population living below the poverty line in 1970, to a low-
middle income economy with less than 10 per cent of the population living below the 
poverty line. Indonesia’s income per capita trebled during the period. Moreover, the 
purchasing power of per capita income increased four-fold to reach nearly $2,500 in 
1993. This represented rapid growth in wealth (Ariff & Khalid 1999). 
Reforms during the period 1982-1992 were a response to the external shock of falling 
oil prices. This induced the policy makers to maintain high GDP growth rates by 
improving private investments and expanding non-oil exports. In addition, external 
and domestic imbalances were stabilised. 
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Investments have been rapidly growing in line with GDP, forming a powerful engine 
for economic growth. Inflation rates were brought down to a single digit in the mid-
1980s and remained there in late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The Korean experience of reforms is unique and phenomenal. Following a cautious 
and gradual path the Korean economy achieved an excellent growth result and turned 
from a poor developing economy to an upper-middle level developed economy. After 
the slowdown in 1980, the Korean economy grew on average by an impressive 7.83 
per cent during 1981-1985, and even more impressive by over 9 per cent during 1986-
1991. The GDP per capita more than doubled during the period 1983-1993. The 
purchasing power of GDP per capita also substantially increased and reached 
US$10,000 by 19931
                                                 
1 In current international US$ 
. A high level (over 30 per cent of GDP) of domestic savings and 
investments rates were major drivers of the growth. Main economic indicators of 
Indonesia and Korea are presented in Table 6 below. 
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Table 6. Main economic indicators of development 
 
Indicator  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
GDP growth, %  
Indonesia 8 7 3 6 5 6 9 9 9 7 7 
Korea 11 8 7 11 11 11 7 9 9 6 6 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)  
Indonesia 444 467 474 494 511 534 572 612 656 692 730 
Korea 3884 4147 4386 4807 5291 5798 6130 6615 7169 7522 7912 
GDP per capita (PPP, 2005 international US$)  
Indonesia 1511 1590 1616 1681 1739 1817 1948 2085 2233 2355 2487 
Korea 6664 7047 7724 8501 9316 9849 10628 11519 12086 12713 13675 
Gross domestic savings to GDP, %  
Indonesia 30 30 30 29 32 32 35 32 33 33 32 
Korea 30 31 34 37 39 36 36 37 36 36 36 
Investment to GDP, %  
Indonesia 31 27 28 30 30 29 33 31 32 30 29 
Korea 30 30 29 30 31 34 38 40 37 36 37 
Unemployment (% of labour force)  
Indonesia na na 2 3 na 3 3  na na 3 na 
Korea 4 4 4 3 2 3 2  2 2 3 2 
Life expectancy (Years)  
Indonesia na na 59 na 60 na na 62 na 63 na 
Korea na 69 na 70 na 71 71 72 72 73 na 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators Online, International Financial Statistics Online databases and the author’s 
calculations 
 
 
The high economic growth was reflected in the large positive impact on the lives of 
Korean people. Unemployment rate remained low and declined to 2 pe r cent. Life 
expectancy improved by nearly 20 years during the period 1965-1995. The infant 
mortality dropped to 11 per 1,000 births. Due to substantial investment in education 
(21 per cent of the national budget), the illiteracy level virtually dropped to zero (Ariff 
& Khalid 1999). 
In Indonesia, social indicators, like education and health, have also improved over the 
period: the literacy rate rose by around 20 per cent and the infant mortality rate fell 
from 132 per 1,000 in 1970 to 69 per 1,000 in 1990 (Hill 1996). Life expectancy grew 
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to a reasonable 63 years in 1992. The unemployment rate remained low at around 3 
per cent mark. 
In spite these impressive achievements, both countries failed to detect or address a 
number of problems. These problems were exposed with dramatic consequences later, 
during the 1997-1998 Asian crisis. In Indonesia, the crisis exposed weaknesses in the 
financial system, including weak prudential regulations and supervision, over-reliance 
on short-term foreign debt, and exchange rate mismanagement. Problems with the 
financial system, coupled with political instability and various natural disasters, 
brought about a severe reduction of incomes and living standards. 
Similarly, in Korea, policy-makers failed to contain a ballooning short-term foreign 
debt problem, which became particularly apparent after capital account liberalisation. 
Short term debt grew from 14 billion US$ in 1990 (45 per cent of total debt) to 100 
billion US$ in 1996 (64 per cent of total debt). Moreover, unaddressed problems with 
prudential regulations and supervision as well as political instability contributed to the 
problem (Dickinson & Mullineux 2001; Wade 1998; Yoo & Moon 1999). 
However, the impact of the Asian crisis on K orean economy was relatively mild 
thanks to the carefully designed approach to the reforms, which involved exposing the 
Korean financial system to global threats cautiously and strictly in line with well-
thought-out industrial and economic policies. 
6. Conclusion 
Despite numerous common elements, financial sector reform in Indonesia and Korea 
each has unique features. For instance, each country had its own economic pre-reform 
conditions, resource endowments, political environment and cultural traditions. As a 
result, their approaches to financial sector reform also differed. However, the scope of 
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reforms and outcomes of implementing (or not implementing) of specific reform 
measures for both countries were similar. Some important commonalities are 
presented below: 
• Both countries began their financial sector reforms as a result of ongoing 
economic problems, caused by the inefficient allocation of resources, rather 
than starting those reforms to prevent possible resource misallocation 
problems. 
• In both countries, and particularly in Korea, financial sector reform was part of 
a larger economic development programme. Korea was more thorough in that 
regard and planned economic development within a five-year framework. 
• Both countries, and especially Korea, undertook reforms in a gradual manner, 
in some instances through ‘trial and error’. This facilitated avoiding major 
crises during the reform period. 
• Both countries had the political stability and the political will to undertake 
reforms. At a later stage, political instabilities in both countries, particularly in 
Indonesia, hampered the ability of the authorities to react to the problems 
caused by the Asian crisis swiftly and effectively. 
• Both countries were unable to establish an effective prudential regulation and 
supervision system, which became apparent during the Asian crisis. 
By contrast, there were also some differences in the policies approaches adopted in 
the two countries. Indonesia, for example, opened the capital account early and 
therefore heavily relied on f oreign investments in its growth promoting policies. 
Korea relied on i nternal resources for a significant period of the reform process. It 
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opened its capital account later but quickly allowed the huge build up of short-term 
foreign borrowing as in Indonesia, which was one of the other causes of the Asian 
crisis. 
The fact that dissimilar approaches to financial development can work in different 
countries strongly suggests that there is no universal or ‘optimal’ pace and sequencing 
of financial sector reform. Rather the success of financial reforms depends on t he 
political will and technical ability of local policymakers to design and implement a 
reform programme based on the existing economic, political and cultural features of 
the society in question. 
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